This working paper reports the results of an analysis of the farm level impacts for the House and Senate 1995 Farm Bill provisions in the Budget Reconciliation Act. The key difference between these two bills lies in decoupled payments provided by the House Freedom-to-Farm provisions while the Senate retains the current target price concept which ties payments to market price levels.
Utilizing FAPRI's projected market prices for the two options, the results indicate:
The Agricultural and Food Policy Center has previously analyzed the farm level impacts of numerous options for the 1995 Farm Bill. At the present time the Congress has narrowed the policy options to two different programs. The purpose of this report is to provide an unbiased third party analysis of these two farm bill options on the economic viability of representative crop, livestock, and dairy farms. The policy options analyzed in this paper, are referred to by the names of the "Senate provisions" and the "House provisions." The major program parameters for these two farm program options are summarized in Table 1.
The aggregate impacts for the two farm policy alternatives were analyzed by the Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri-Columbia and Iowa
State University. The FAPRI results are summarized in Appendix A and were used for the farm
level analysis. The farm level analysis used the Farm Level Income and Policy Simulation Model
(FLIPSIM) developed and maintained at AFPC. The FLIPSIM model was run in the stochastic
mode to compare how the two farm policy options would likely affect income risk for
representative farms.
The remainder of the report is divided into five sections. The following section briefly describes the provisions of the two farm programs. The second section outlines the FAPRI and AFPC modeling systems used for the analyses. The third, fourth and final sections report the results for representative crop, dairy, and livestock farms, respectively.
Senate Provisions
The Senate provisions would increase nonpaid acreage (NFA) to 30 percent and allow complete flexibility for wheat and feed grain acreage. This increased flexibility would allow farmers to produce alternative crops, including oilseeds, on their base acreage. Grain farmers would have the option to freely flex wheat and feed grains while protecting their grain bases and continuing to receive deficiency payments. Cotton and rice farmers would not have as much flexibility. Farms operating with a cotton and/or rice base would operate under rules somewhat similar to the current program with the exception that the NFA/OFA levels have changed. That is, the Senate provisions call for a 30 percent NFA and a 70 percent OFA for cotton and rice. If cotton farmers were to overplant their cotton base acreage using wheat or feed grain base, they would have to give up deficiency payments on wheat and feed grains. Conversely, if they were to plant an alternative crop on the 70 percent OFA on their cotton base, they would give up cotton deficiency payments. Farms with cotton and rice base, however, could overplant those bases by the equivalent of 25 percent of historical soybean production.
Deficiency payments would continue using the formula in the current farm bill; however, a cap on the deficiency payment rate is added to the formula. The effective deficiency payment rate caps (proposed caps adjusted for non-paid NFA percentage) for wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, cotton, and rice are summarized in Table 2. Annual acreage reduction authority is eliminated. CBO has estimated that the Senate provisions would meet the federal budget resolution target spending reduction of $13.4 billion over the 7 year period from 1996-2002. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was assumed to be reduced in size to approximately 17 million acres by 2002.
House Provisions
The House provisions provide farmers with fixed annual payments based on historical deficiency and marketing loan payments adjusted to equal $43.2 billion through fiscal year 2002. These decoupled payments would replace deficiency and marketing loan deficiency payments. Estimates for the fixed payment rates in the House provisions are presented in Table 2. For the House provisions, the nonrecourse loan rate would be set at 70 percent of the five year Olympic average of market prices but could be lowered by the Secretary as a means of allowing the market to clear and avoiding government acquisition of stocks. Farmers would be given complete planting flexibility within their total acreage base (TAB) and soybeans would be included in the TAB.
Acreage reduction authority would be eliminated under the FTFA policy option. It is projected that the Conservation Reserve Program would be reduced to 22 million acres by year 2002. Payment limit "person" determinations would remain as under the current farm program. The three entity rule, however, would be eliminated. Government payments would be attributed to an individual's social security number. This analysis assumed that the provision would not restrict payments to the representative farms. Budget savings would equal the resolution target of $13.4 billion over FY 1996-2002 with approximately $11.0 billion of the savings coming from the major program crops.
Macroeconomic Modeling System
The aggregate economic impacts in this working paper were obtained from FAPRI. Assumed loan rates, target prices, and annual inflation rates used by FAPRI for analysis of the two options are summarized in Appendix A. FAPRI's projected commodity prices are summarized for the two policy options in Appendix Table A1 and the projected livestock prices under the two policy options are in Table A5.
Crop prices projected by FAPRI for the present analyses are more optimistic than reported for the January 1995 Baseline. FAPRI's explanation for the higher crop prices included changing supply and demand conditions and for the longer-term increased demand for imports by China and the Pacific Rim countries. Also, the current crop prices reflect a more rapid recovery of the Former Soviet Union than was assumed for the January Baseline. The more optimistic export demands are based in part on recent increases in exports and stronger prices for 1995. For a detailed explanation of the FAPRI projections refer to the FAPRI Policy Working Paper 15-95.
Both of the farm policy options analyzed are part of the Budget Reconciliation Act which is designed to achieve a balanced budget. As a result, the present report uses lower annual rates of inflation and interest rates than have been used for previous AFPC policy analyses this year. The rates of inflation and interest rates reported in Appendix Table A6 were used by FAPRI to project production costs for crops and livestock in their aggregate models and in the AFPC farm level simulation model. These rates of inflation and interest rates were reported in September by WEFA assuming the budget is essentially balanced by 2002.
Representative Farm Modeling System
AFPC has developed and maintains data to simulate 72 representative crop and livestock farms chosen from major production areas across the United States (Figure 1). Characteristics for each of the farms in terms of size, crop mix, assets, and average receipts are summarized in Appendix C. The location of these farms was the result of discussions with staffers for the House and Senate Agriculture Committees. Information necessary to simulate the economic activity on these representative farms was developed from panels of producers using a consensus building interview process. Normally two farms are developed in each region using separate panels of producers: one is representative of moderate size full-time farm operations, while the second panel represents farms that are two to three times larger.
The data collected from the panel farms are analyzed in a whole farm simulation model
(FLIPSIM) that was developed by AFPC and has been refined for more than a decade. The
producer panels are provided pro-forma financial statements for their representative farm and are
asked to verify the accuracy of the past year and the reasonableness of a four to five year
projection. The panel must approve of the model's ability to the project economic activity for
their representative farm prior to using the farm for policy analyses. The land grant university
cooperators and panel members for the representative farms used for this report are listed in
Appendix D.
All farms used in the analysis have been updated through 1992 with the input data indexed to begin the analysis in 1994. Actual yields and prices reflective of the representative farms' areas for 1994 are utilized for the present analyses. FAPRI projections of prices and yields for 1995-2002 are utilized for the policy analyses. All of the crop farms are assumed to begin 1994 with 20 percent intermediate- and long-term debt, based on information provided by ERS/USDA and the panel members. Initial debt levels for dairy farms were set at 30 percent, while initial debt levels for beef cattle ranches was 5 percent and initial debt levels for hog farms was 45 percent.
Flex Decisions
The Senate and House provisions provide for increased flexibility in determining acreages of each crop planted and the crops which can be produced. The House provisions remove all restrictions related to crops produced and the number of acres planted to particular crops. The Senate provisions increase the nonpaid flex acreage from 15 to 30 percent and optional flex acres from 10 to 70 percent. To project the implications of increased planting flexibility for the two policy options on the representative farms, the per acre marginal returns for each crop were examined for each farm. Based on the marginal returns analysis each farm was permitted to flex to its best crop mix, given constraints on irrigation, soil types, and cultural considerations. A summary of the likely changes in crop mixes for the representative farms under the Senate and House provisions are provided in Appendix C.
Incorporating Risk
Crop, livestock, and dairy farms are subjected to risk from many sources. The two most significant sources of risk are yields (crop yields, weaning weights, and milk per cow) and market prices. AFPC's farm level simulation model incorporates historical yield and price variability for crop, livestock, and dairy enterprises based on ten years of actual yields and prices for the panel farm members. Figure 2 depicts the process for incorporating risk into the present analysis. The producers' average yields for crops and livestock are used to simulate risk associated with output (ie., weather risk) for the yield probability distributions (Figure 2). The shapes of the yield distributions are dependent upon local yield histories for each enterprise (crop or livestock).
Annual prices for crops and livestock from FAPRI are used as the mean prices in the representative farms' price probability distributions, as depicted by the middle price distribution in Figure 2. Two additional price distributions were simulated as part of a sensitivity analysis for the crop farms; the first distribution assumed that mean crop prices were 5 percent lower than FAPRI's prices in Appendix Table A1 (left price distribution in Figure 2) and the second price distribution assumed all crop prices were 5 percent greater than FAPRI's prices. The random prices were simulated using a procedure which guaranteed that the relative variability of prices about their means was held constant for the three alternative price distributions. This procedure also guaranteed that crop prices generated for the Senate provisions had the same relative variability as crop prices generated for the House provisions. Therefore, the results for each farm can be compared to determine not only the impact of a policy option on a farm's level of net farm income, but also the policy option's impact on the variability of net income.
Randomly generated crop prices were used to calculate deficiency payment rates under the Senate provisions (footnote 1). The average annual deficiency payment rates from these calculations are summarized in Table 3 for years 1996-2002. The average annual deficiency payment rates for corn reach their high value ($0.425/bu.) in 1999 (Table 3). The estimated average deficiency payment rates in the top part of Table 3 can not be compared directly to the decoupled payment rates in the House provisions because the deficiency payment rates do not reflect the 30 percent non-paid acreage fraction. Average deficiency payment rates for the Senate provisions in the bottom part of Table 3 are adjusted to reflect the 30 percent NFA and are directly comparable to the decoupled payment rates in the House provisions.
A secondary benefit to incorporating price risk into the study is the ability to project the probability that deficiency payment rates would hit the cap in the Senate provisions (Table 4). The probability that the wheat deficiency payment rates would hit the cap is 22 to 38 percent over the period 1996-1999, but after 1999 the probability increases to 65 to 69 percent. A similiar pattern is observed for rice and cotton because the deficiency payment rate caps for wheat, cotton, and rice are reduced in those years. The probability of the payment rates for corn hitting the cap is between 20 and 49 percent each year of the planning horizon because the corn deficiency payment cap is not reduced below its initial 1996 level.
The results of simulating 36 representative crop farms for 1994-2002 under the Senate and
House provisions are summarized in this section. Average annual net cash farm incomes for both
policy options are presented in Table 5, as well as the coefficients of variation for net cash farm
income. Average annual net cash farm income for the moderate size Iowa grain farm (IAG760)
would be $32,500 for the Senate provisions and $23,330 for the House provisions. The
coefficient of variation is approximately 50 percent for the Senate provisions and 70 percent for
the House provisions; meaning that for the IAG760 farm the Senate provisions generate about 20
percent less risk on net farm income.
Eight of the ten feed grain farms had greater average annual net cash farm incomes under the Senate provisions than under the House provisions(Figure 3) (footnote 2). Seven of the eight wheat farms had larger average annual net cash farm incomes under the House provisions (Figure 4). Six of the ten cotton farms had higher average net cash farm incomes under the Senate provisions (Figure 5). Seven of the eight rice farms would have higher average annual net cash farm incomes under the House provisions (Figure 6).
The level of net cash farm income is only one factor farmers must consider when analyzing policy options. Risk associated with net cash farm income should be considered. The coefficients of variation on net cash farm income for six of the ten feed grain farms are lower under the Senate provisions than under the House provisions (Table 5). Five of the eight wheat farms had lower coefficients of variation on net cash farm income under the House provisions. For the cotton farms six of the ten farms had lower relative income risk under the House provisions than under the Senate provisions. Half of the rice farms had lower income risk under the House provisions. However, the coefficient of variation is not always a reliable measure of risk associated with net cash farm income when net income can take on both positive and negative values. As the mean of net cash income approaches zero, the coefficient of variation gets very large, for example, it is 444.7 percent for the moderate size Texas grain farm (TXNP1600) with a mean income of $3,890. Given the problem with using the coefficient of variation to measure risk, an alternative method (stochastic dominance) for projecting producer rankings of the two farm policy options based on level and risk of net income was used for the present analysis.
Based on the levels and risk of net farm incomes, the projected rankings for the two policy options are summarized by farm in Table 6. The results for FAPRI's most likely price projections indicate that eight of the ten feed grain farms would rank the Senate provisions (S) over the House provisions (H), while two farms would rank the House provisions (H) higher. Market prices are not easy to project so two alternative price paths were analyzed in addition to the most likely price scenario developed by FAPRI. If market prices were actually 5 percent less than the prices projected by FAPRI, then nine of the ten feed grain farms would rank the Senate provisions over the House provisions and one farm would be indifferent (-). If crop prices were 5 percent higher, then five of the ten feed grain farms rank the Senate provisions over the House, two farms rank the House provisions first, and three farms are indifferent. The feed grain farm results for the price sensitivity analyses are as one would expect; as prices decline deficiency payments in the Senate provisions provide more income protection than decoupled payment rates, thus making the Senate provisions more beneficial. On the other hand, as prices increase the deficiency payment rates in the Senate provisions are reduced relative to the House's decoupled payment rates, thus making the House provisions more beneficial.
The performance rankings for the eight wheat farms indicate that three of the farms would be indifferent between the Senate and House provisions while the remaining five farms would prefer the House provisions (Table 6). If market prices were 5 percent lower the rankings for the wheat farms would shift toward the Senate provisions as six of the farms are indifferent between the House and Senate provisions and only two farms continue to prefer the House provisions. A 5 percent increase in crop prices would shift the rankings toward the House provisions as all but one of the eight representative wheat farms rank the House provisions over the Senate provisions.
Based on the ranking procedure eight of the ten representative cotton farms are indifferent between the House and Senate provisions, given the market prices in the FAPRI projections (Table 6). Reducing the FAPRI prices for crops by 5 percent would cause all ten of the cotton farms to rank the Senate provisions over the House provisions. Conversely, increasing FAPRI's prices 5 percent would cause all but one of the representative cotton farms to rank the House provisions over the Senate provisions.
Four of the eight representative rice farms rank the House provisions over the Senate provisions at the initial prices provided by FAPRI (Table 6). The three remaining rice farms are indifferent between the two provisions for these crop prices and one farm ranks the Senate over the House. Decreasing all crop prices 5 percent would cause four of the eight rice farms to rank the Senate provisions first, while two farms would continue to rank the House provisions first. Increasing crop prices 5 percent would lead to seven of the eight farms ranking the House provisions over the Senate provisions and one farm being indifferent.
The main difference between the House and Senate dairy provisions lies in the elimination of
marketing orders under the House option. The House bill distributes the savings from order
elimination to producers via direct payments based on historical production. FAPRI's projected
milk prices for the two farm program options are summarized in Table A5. The Senate provisions
result in higher average annual US milk prices for 1996-2002.
The benefits from milk marketing orders tend to accrue to markets more distant from the Midwest since higher prices are paid for milk used for fluid purposes further from Wisconsin. As a result, marketing order elimination tends to benefit farms in the Midwest and the Upper Midwest while reducing incomes for farmers outside of these regions. This result is evident in FAPRI's projected prices which have milk prices in the Midwest and Upper Midwest slightly higher for the House provisions after 1999 (Table A5). The result of changing the regional price relationships directly impacts net incomes for the representative dairy farms (Table 7 and Figure 7)(footnote 3). The Missouri and Wisconsin farms would likely suffer small reductions in net cash farm income (3 to 6 percent) compared to much greater net income losses for farms in Washington (11 to 21 percent), California (10 percent), New York (18 to 45 percent), Georgia (28 to 37 percent), and Florida (34 to 100 percent).
However, all 22 of the representative dairy farms would have lower net cash farm incomes under the House provisions than under the Senate provisions (Table 7). These results suggest that the benefits of direct payments under the House provisions do not offset the adverse impacts of lower milk prices, even for the Midwest and Upper Midwest dairy farms.
The dairy farm analysis also considered the impacts of the House and Senate provisions on crop prices and thus costs of feedstuffs for livestock. Corn and soybean prices are lower under the House provisions for 1996-2002 which should have increased the net returns for dairy farms, relative to the Senate provisions. However, the components in input costs did not offset the milk price differential that favored the Senate provisions, thus net returns for dairy farms were higher under the Senate provisions. A minor factor in the lower income levels for the House provisions was the slightly lower prices for culled cows associated with the House provisions.
The simulated incomes for the 22 representative dairy farms were used to project the likely rankings of the two options if one considered both the level and risk of net income. The results indicated that all of the dairy farms ranked the Senate provisions over the House provisions with the basic FAPRI prices, as well as prices that were plus and minus 5 percent from FAPRI's basic prices (Table 8).
The results of simulating the six representative cattle ranches and eight representative hog farms for 1994-2002 under the Senate and House provisions are summarized in this section. FAPRI's projected cattle and hog prices were marginally higher under the Senate provisions than under the House provisions (Table A5). The cost of primary feed ingredients such as corn and soybean meal were slightly higher under the Senate provisions while the hay price was marginally lower (Table A1).
All six cattle ranches and seven of the eight hog farms had greater average annual net cash farm incomes under the Senate provisions than under the House provisions (Figure 8 and Table 9)(footnote 4). The differences in average annual net cash farm income between the Senate and House provisions for the cattle ranches were very small with the Northwest Missouri cattle/grain/hog (MONB150) farm having the biggest difference ($6,000).
The differences in average annual net cash farm income for the hog farms were considerably larger than for the cattle ranches (Figure 8 and Table 9). The large Illinois hog farm (ILH450) experienced an average difference of $42,000 between the Senate and House provisions. The only hog farm that experienced greater net cash incomes under the House provisions was the moderate North Carolina hog farm (NCH350) which averaged $760 higher annual net cash farm income; the higher net income came from increased receipts from hay sales due to higher hay prices.
The level of net cash farm income is only one factor farmers must consider when analyzing policy options. Risk associated with net cash farm income should be considered. The coefficients of variation on net cash farm income for the beef cattle operations are lower under the Senate provisions than under the House provisions (Table 9). While only three of eight hog farms had lower coefficients of variation for net cash farm income under the Senate provisions.
The results indicate that cattle ranches and hog farms would not benefit from the lower feed prices due to increased planting flexibility contained in the House provisions. The representative hog farms and cattle ranches would earn greater incomes under the Senate provisions, although in the case of hogs the income will be slightly more variable.
Feed Grain Farms
| IAG760 | a 760-acre Northwestern Iowa (Webster County) moderate size grain farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. The 50/50 corn/soybean crop mix currently employed on this farm is deemed to be economically and biologically sustainable. |
| IAG1500 | a 1,500-acre Northwestern Iowa (Webster County) large grain farm. The farm planted soybeans on its 15 percent non-paid acreage under the 1990 Farm Bill. Under the Senate and House bills the farm will flex 19 percent of its non-paid corn acreage to soybeans. This fraction represents a maximum 45/55 corn/soybean rotation for this farm. |
| MOG1250 | a 1,250-acre North Central Missouri (Carroll County) Moderate Grain farm. The farm planted soybeans on non-paid corn base and 25 percent of wheat base under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will plant 51 percent of its wheat base to soybeans under the Senate and House bills, while planting all of its corn base to corn. This planting decision results in a maximum 45/55 corn/soybean rotation for this farm. |
| MOG2400 | a 2,400-acre North Central Missouri (Carroll County) large grain farm. The farm planted soybeans on non-paid corn base and 25 percent of wheat base under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will plant 51 percent of its wheat base to soybeans under the Senate and House bill, while planting all of its corn base to corn. This planting decision mirrors this farms moderate farm counterpart. |
| NEG800 | a 800-acre South Central Nebraska (Phelps County) moderate irrigated grain farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| NEG1575 | a 1,575-acre South Central Nebraska (Phelps County) large irrigated grain farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| TXNP1600 | a 1,600-acre Northern High Plains of Texas (Moore County) moderate irrigated grain farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| TXNP4500 | a 4,500-acre Northern High Plains of Texas (Moore County) large irrigated grain farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| SCG1500 | a 1,500-acre South Carolina (Clarendon County) moderate grain farm. The farm flexed its NFA corn acres to soybeans under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will continue to plant 15 percent of corn to soybeans under the alternative programs thereby maintaining a preferred corn/soybean rotation. |
| SCG3500 | a 3,500-acre South Carolina (Clarendon County) large grain farm. The farm flexed NFA cotton acreage to corn under the 1990 Farm Bill. Under the Senate bill the farm will plant non-paid cotton acreage to corn (30 percent) but under the House bill the farm will plant all cotton base to corn. |
Wheat Farms
| WAW1276 | a 1,276-acre Southeastern Washington (Whitman County) moderate wheat farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA barley base to wheat under the 1990 Farm Bill. Under the Senate and House Bills the farm will flex 33 percent of the barley base to wheat thereby maintaining a feasible wheat/barley rotation. |
| WAW4250 | a 4,250-acre Southeastern Washington (Whitman County) moderate wheat farm. The farm flexed 6 percent of barley base to wheat under the 1990 Farm Bill. Under the Senate and House provisions the farm will continue to flex 6 percent of the barley base to wheat thereby maintaining a feasible wheat/barley rotation. |
| NDW1600 | a 1,600-acre South Central North Dakota (Barnes County) moderate wheat farm. The farm flexed NFA barley to wheat under the 1990 Farm Bill. Due to reductions in EEP (which reduce future wheat prices) under the alternative bills the farm will no longer take advantage of flexibility provisions. |
| NDW4000 | a 4,000-acre South Central North Dakota (Barnes County) large wheat farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA barley to wheat under the 1990 Farm Bill. Due to reductions in EEP (which reduce future wheat prices) under the alternative bills the farm will no longer take advantage of flexibility provisions. |
| KSW1175 | a 1,175-acre South Central Kansas (Sumner County) moderate wheat farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| KSW2800 | a 2,800-acre South Central Kansas (Sumner County) large wheat farm. The farm flexed 4.3 percent of wheat NFA to sorghum under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will flex 8.6 percent of wheat NFA to sorghum under the alternative programs. This percentage reflects the amount of non-paid custom harvested wheat acreage which is shifted to sorghum thus allowing more efficient use of the farm's machinery complement. |
| COW2500 | a 2,500-acre Northeast Colorado (Washington County) moderate wheat farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| COW4000 | a 4,000-acre Northeast Colorado (Washington County) large wheat farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
Cotton Farms
| TXSP1360 | a 1,360-acre Texas Southern High Plains (Dawson County) moderate cotton farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| TXSP3334 | a 3.334-acre Texas Southern High Plains (Dawson County) large cotton farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| TXRP1700 | a 1,700-acre Rolling Plains of Texas (Jones County) moderate cotton farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA wheat to cotton under the 1990 Farm Bill. The Farm will flex 59 percent of its wheat base to cotton under the alternative bills. This mix maintains enough wheat acreage to graze cattle. |
| TXRP2500 | a 2,500-acre Rolling Plains of Texas (Jones County) moderate cotton farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA wheat to cotton under the 1990 Farm Bill. The Farm will flex 59 percent of its wheat base to cotton under the alternative bills. This mix maintains enough wheat acreage to graze cattle. |
| TXBL1200 | a 1,200-acre Texas Blacklands (Williamson County) moderate cotton farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA sorghum to cotton under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will flex 50 percent of sorghum base to cotton under the alternative programs. This crop mix reflects an economic incentive to plant cotton coupled with a rotational constraint that will not allow a monoculture cotton rotation. |
| TXCB1700 | a 1,700-acre Texas Coastal Bend (San Patricio County) large cotton farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA sorghum to cotton under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will flex 50 percent of sorghum base to cotton under the alternative programs. This crop mix reflects an economic incentive to plant cotton coupled with a rotational constraint that will not allow a monoculture cotton rotation. |
| CAC900 | a 900-acre Southern San Joaquin Valley California (Kern County) moderate cotton farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| CAC3150 | a 3,150-acre Southern San Joaquin Valley California (Kern County) large cotton farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| MSC1635 | a 1,635-acre Mississippi Delta (Washington County) moderate cotton farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| MSC3620 | a 3,620-acre Mississippi Delta (Washington County) moderate cotton farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
Rice Farms
| CAR424 | a 424-acre Sacramento Valley California (Sutter and Yuba Counties) moderate rice farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not flex in the alternative bills. |
| CAR1300 | a 1,300-acre Sacramento Valley California (Sutter and Yuba Counties) large rice farm. The farm did not plant non-paid acres under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not plant non-paid acres under the Senate Bill. The farm will plant only 70 percent of its historical rice base under the House Bill. These reduced plantings are due to the farms inability to produce positive returns from rice on non-paid acreage. |
| TXR1500 | a 1,500-acre West of Houston, Texas (Wharton County) moderate rice farm. The farm did not plant non-paid acres under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not plant non-paid acres under the Senate Bill. The farm will plant only 70 percent of its historical rice base under the House Bill. These reduced plantings are due to the farms inability to produce positive returns from rice on non-paid acreage. |
| TXR3900 | a 3,900-acre West of Houston, Texas (Wharton County) moderate rice farm. The farm did not plant non-paid acres under the 1990 Farm Bill and will not plant non-paid acres under the Senate Bill. The farm will plant only 70 percent of its historical rice base under the House Bill. These reduced plantings are due to the farms inability to produce positive returns from rice on non-paid acreage. |
| MOR1900 | a 1,900-acre southeastern Missouri (Butler County) moderate rice farm. The farm flexed NFA rice to corn under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will plant 30 percent of its rice base to corn under the alternative bills. |
| MOR4000 | a 4,000-acre southeastern Missouri (Butler County) large rice farm. The farm flexed NFA rice and cotton to corn under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will plant 30 percent of its rice base to corn and 40 percent of its cotton base to corn under the Senate bill. The farm will plant 30 percent of its rice base to corn and 100 percent of its cotton base to corn under the House Bill. The reductions in rice and cotton acreage reflect the farms inability to produce adequate returns from these two crops on non-paid acreage. |
| ARR1260 | a 1,260-acre Arkansas (Poinsett County) moderate rice farm. The farm flexed NFA and OFA wheat acreage to rice under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will flex 30 of its wheat base to rice under the alternative bills. |
| LAR1100 | a 1,100-acre Louisiana (Jefferson Davis, Acadia, and Vermilion Parishes) moderate rice farm. The farm did not flex under the 1990 Farm Bill. The farm will move 25 percent of historical soybean plantings to rice under the alternative bills. Any additional moves in soybean acreage to rice are prohibited by legislation in the Senate Bill and by financing constraints under either alternative bill. |